Zimbabweans are on edge because maybe, just maybe, the
crisis of sorts that has riddled the nation could very well be over. The
hunger, poverty, displacement, and disenfranchisement could all end.
And that hope, that glimmer of an end, is all the more reason to be on
edge because the status quo is beyond untenable.
How did we get here? President Robert Mugabe and ZANU-PF miscalculated and they miscalculated badly.
First,
they misjudged when they assumed that the legislative concessions they
granted in the Mbeki mediated pre-election talks would not come back to
haunt them. Prior to the elections, Patrick Chinamasa, the Justice
Minister, agreed to curtail the despotic extremes of three pieces of
legislation: the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act
(AIPPA), the Public Order and Security Act (POSA), and the Electoral Act
(EA).
AIPPA was amended to make it easier for foreign
journalists and Zimbabweans working for foreign entities to operate. The
change to POSA — that political parties only had to notify the
police as opposed to request their sanction before the held rallies —
proved to be pivotal in the MDC’s ability to broadcast their message.
The
EA changed in two important ways that proved to be ZANU-PF’s
unraveling. First, the act created an autonomous electoral commission —
the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC). Not only was ZEC created, but
many brave Zimbabweans who served the commission disposed of their
mission impartially and stood up to ZANU-PF in keeping with their
constitutional mandate, something for which they are now being persecuted.
Further, changes to the EA compelled that results from each polling
station be posted publicly as soon as they had been counted.
Second,
ZANU-PF grossly underestimated the opposition’s ability to get
organized and offer stiff competition. The MDC mobilized a campaign that
featured candidates in most of the contested council, parliamentary,
and senate seats nationwide and, of course, Tsvangirai — the bane of
Mugabe’s despotism. They were also able to deploy a massive amount of
polling officers to over 9,000 polling stations, They not only observed
the process, but vitally recorded and archived the results before
relaying them back to party’s central command. This made cheating very
difficult and is the reason the MDC beat ZEC to the ball when it came
time to announce results.
But third and most importantly, ZANU-PF
underestimated the people’s discontent with the party. They expected
the Zimbabwean people to carry their load one too many times. They
relied on their decade-old denigration of the opposition as stooges of
the west just a little too much. And all of a sudden, the very people
whose subjugation ZANU had come to expect turned their backs on the
party, leaving them exposed. ZANU has no one else to blame for this but
themselves. The MDC has persistently increased their electoral winnings
each time they have contested an election. ZANU’s strategists should
have paid this widely apparent trend more attention, but they didn’t.
So here we are.
Last modified on Monday, 26 July 2010 10:03